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Economic drivers, technologies and demand side management are keys 
in understanding the long-term trends of both energy and more 
specifically electricity consumption. This paper  discusses some of the 
important economics foundations of energy demand in general, and 
electricity in particular. First, we look at the macro-economic context of 
energy. This reveals how energy and electricity consumption are subject 
to the same drivers - income and price - over long periods. However, 
energy demand (and carbon emissions) falls and energy prices rises in 
one country may have little effect at the world level. Next, we examine 
the features of energy service expenditures. Despite similarities over 
time, specific sectors are distinct from one another in terms of 
consumption profiles, and new sources of electricity demand may 
substantially change total demand and the way it is consumed. This 
leads us to a closer look at the micro-economic context of energy 
demand, and the tension between technically possible energy savings 
one one side, and the economics and behavioural dimensions on the 
other side. We conclude by highlighting the various unknowns and 
uncertainties that characterise the future of energy demand.  
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1. Introduction 
In the UK, electricity demand grew by 2.4% p.a. between 1970 and 2005, to 
reach a record high of 357 TWh, but then declined to 330 TWh in 2009 following 
the sharp recession which began in 2008.3 However longer run trends suggest 
increasing electricity demand globally in the future, and even in the UK. Figure 1 
shows the trends in electricity consumption in the UK since 1960 for the 
residential; public administration, transport, agricultural and commercial 
sectors; and industrial sectors. In the residential sector, consumption increased 
by 59% between 1970 and 2009 (DUKES, 2010). The largest household 
electricity consumption increase is due to consumer electronics, as will be shown 
later in this paper. Commercial and public services have used sharply more 
electricity since 1970, with a rise of 140% to 2009 (DUKES, 2010). Consumption 
by industry, by contrast, has been decreasing recently, with a steady decrease 
since 2005, partly due to deindustrialization, the recent recession and increased 
                                                 
1 The work was supported by the ESRC Electricity Policy Research Group and the EPSRC Flexnet 
project. 
2 Correspondence: ESRC Electricity Policy Research Group, EPRG, Judge Business School, 
University of Cambridge; email: lp361@cam.ac.uk 
3 See Table 5.1.2 in “Digest of United Kingdom energy statistics 2010: long-term trends”, available 
at http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Statistics/publications/dukes/324-dukes-2010-
longterm.pdf, last accessed 15 October 2010. 
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energy efficiency (DECC, 2010a).  In the longer run however electric vehicles and 
the electrification of the heat sector (should natural gas decline as the heating 
fuel of choice) will provide significant new sources of growth of electricity 
demand.  
Figure 1: UK final electricity consumption by sector, 1960-2009 
 
 
Sources: 1960-2004: IEA (2010a); 2005-2009: DUKES (2010).  
Figure 2 shows the scale of the potential impact of electrification of transport 
and heat on household electricity demand. Household transport demand for 
petroleum is around four times the energy value of the electricity used for 
lighting and appliances.4 Electrification of water and space heating, currently 
                                                 
4 Given substantial transformation losses in electricity supply, around 2.5 times the amount of 
raw energy is required to supply a given level of electricity to the home, so Figure 2 exaggerates 
the relative size of transport demand to lighting and appliance demand, but the scope for 
increased demand for electricity is clear. 
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largely (though not entirely) supplied via natural gas would produce a significant 
rise in demand for electricity.5 
Figure 2: UK domestic energy consumption by end use, 1970 to 2008  
 
 
Source: DECC (2010b). 
This suggests that income, technologies and demand side management are keys 
in understanding the long-term trends of energy and more specifically electricity 
consumption. Future energy trends are central to policy making. This paper 
intends to uncover what lessons can be learned from the empirical evidence. It 
looks back at the history of energy demand, discusses key technological and 
price developments as well as the demand side issues that have led us to where 
we are now and are likely to continue guiding future energy developments. By 
doing so, the paper, which is a working paper version of the opening chapter of 
the book “The Future of Electricity Demand: Customers, Citizens and Loads”, lays 
                                                 
5 Around 80% of households are on the gas network, the rest mainly use oil or electricity for 
heating. 
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out some economic fundamentals of energy demand, which underpin some of the 
analysis in later chapters of the book. It is not intended to cover the extensive 
literature surrounding energy demand (for a recent review of energy demand 
modelling, see Steinbuks, 2011), but rather to bring together a number of key 
factors influencing energy demand and reflect on some likely future 
developments, in light of current challenges. A number of unknowns are 
highlighted, that testify to the fact that we are now at a crossroads in the history 
of energy consumption and a number of different paths are possible. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the long-run macro-
economic context of energy demand; in section 3, we discuss the long-run micro-
economic context of energy demand, and offers some initial conclusions in 
section 4. 
 
2. The long-run macroeconomic context of energy 
demand 
2.1 The drivers of aggregate energy consumption 
The 2050 decarbonisation target context in which many energy and climate 
policies are framed immediately gives rise to a long run comparative view of how 
energy demand is likely to evolve. It is instructive to examine what the evidence 
of history says about this. Figure 3 shows the evolution of energy consumption 
per head versus GDP per head over the period 1972-08. The solid line shows a 
linear relationship through the data. The data shows the strong positive 
relationship between energy consumption and income for most countries. Only 
Germany and the US show significant reductions over longer periods. In 
Germany this occurs at a high level of income, while in the US this occurs at a 
very high level of energy consumption and occurs following the oil price shocks 
of the mid 1970s and mid-1980s.  Figure 3 also illustrates (by implication) how 
rising population contributes to absolute growth in energy consumption. 
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Figure 3: Income as a driver of energy consumption – energy use per head versus GDP per 
head, 1972-2008 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2010). 
 
Figure 4 highlights the role of price in explaining the differences in energy 
consumption between countries. Higher prices are associated with lower levels 
of energy consumption. Indeed the oil intensity of GDP (units of oil consumed 
per unit of GDP) is proportionately reduced for proportionate increase in the 
average energy price (including taxes). Indeed the fitted line shows the price 
elasticity of demand for units of energy in an economy, which is highly elastic, i.e. 
1% increase in average price reduces energy consumption by 2%. Comparison of 
the 1998-2005 period with the earlier period 1990-97 indicates that the 
revealed elasticity is increasing between the earlier and later periods. This 
means that the differences in levels of energy intensity at the same income level 
significantly reflect price differentials.  
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Figure 4: Price as a driver of energy consumption – energy intensity versus energy prices 
 
  
Source: Data from Steinbuks (2010).  
 
Figure 5 suggests that the price relationship for electricity demand across 
countries is similar to that for overall energy demand. Countries that have very 
high prices (due to taxation) tend to have lower demand for electricity, while 
countries that have very low prices (due to subsidy) tend to have very high 
consumption. We can conclude from Figure 5, that price and income are some of 
the key triggers for both electricity demand and overall energy consumption. 
In order for us to gain perspective on what historians might be saying one 
hundred years from now we can look further back in to history. In order to 
evaluate climate policy, historians in 2110 may look back on the national and 
international efforts to decarbonise energy systems which began to be discussed 
seriously in 1988 in the run up to the 1992 Rio Climate Change Summit and the 
many modelling exercises which suggested how carbon dioxide levels should 
evolve to 2100. 
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Figure 5: Price as a driver of electricity consumption: 2008 data 
 
 
Source: IEA (2010b); Countries: Austria, France, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom, Belgium,  
Greece, Netherlands, Spain, United States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, 
Poland, Switzerland, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Turkey.   
 
Figure 6 provides some food for that thought experiment. This figure is taken 
from Allen’s (2009) book where he suggests that the reason why the industrial 
revolution took place in northern England and not elsewhere was significantly to 
do with the relative prices of different inputs to production. In northern England 
a unit of agricultural labour was expensive relative to a unit of energy (due to 
abundant cheap coal and relatively productive agricultural workers). This 
incentivised the use of and innovation in labour saving energy intensive 
technologies (such as the steam engine). Figure 6 shows that in the early 1700s 
labour was almost 5 times more expensive relative to energy in Newcastle than it 
was Strasbourg (and more than ten times more expensive than in Beijing). The 
conclusion which we can draw from this is that energy prices may have triggered 
some of the key developments that led to the British industrial revolution, and 
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hence are likely to matter for future long run economic transitions. This is a 
point made supported by Fouquet and Pearson (2006) who look at the history of 
lighting demand in the UK since the 1300s. 
Figure 6: The role of relative input prices in long run economic development: Price of 
labour relative to energy, early 1700s 
 
 
Source: Allen, 2009, Table 6.2, p.140. 
 
Fouquet and Pearson focus their discussion of energy demand on the services 
produced by energy inputs. Energy consumers are not interested in units of 
energy per se, but rather in the amenities that energy provides (i.e. light, heat, 
transportation) or energy services. Fouquet and Pearson look at how, over a long 
period, technology changes came about as a result of relative costs of different 
technologies (cheaper technologies emerged) and how falling costs (and 
associated falling prices) drove consumption of higher levels of energy services 
consumption. They focus on lighting and the number of lumen hours (i.e. units of 
light supplied for one hour). Figure 7 shows how the price evolve of three 
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technologies which emerged over time in the 1800s (initially as niche 
applications) and then become dominant, as they become cost competitive (on 
the basis of a mixture of price and convenience grounds). Figure 7 shows the 
price evolution of energy services from electric lighting which is now the 
dominant technology. The figure makes the general point that the same 
technology gets cheaper over time but can be overtaken by a new technology. 
Figure 7: How long run technological change drives prices of energy services: Price of light 
1800-1950 
 
 
Source: From Fouquet and Pearson, 2006, with kind permission. 
 
Figure 8 shows the associated impact of the decline in costs and prices on the 
demand for lighting services. Fouquet and Pearson show that the price of a unit 
of lighting services in 2000 was 1/3000 of their real level in 1800 and demand 
per capita had increased 6500 times. This indicates a very significant price effect 
(for one element of overall energy demand). This figure shows how long run 
demand trends are mirrored in long run price trends.  
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Figure 8: How falling prices have driven long run demand for energy services: Demand for 
light 
 
Source: Fouquet and Pearson, 2006, with kind permission. 
 
Given the global nature of the climate problem, it is important to think about 
global energy demand. Price and income effects on energy demand operate 
globally. Raising the price of energy in one country will have very little effect at 
the world level (unless it is a very large country). In particular there might be a 
considerable amount of leakage of energy demand to other countries, such that 
once the embodied energy (and carbon) in imports is taken into account there is 
very little reduction in global energy consumption (and carbon emissions). The 
UK for instance has seen significant reductions in the amount of carbon dioxide it 
has produced domestically since 1990, however it has also seen a significant rise 
in manufactured imports from developing countries (and relative reduction in 
domestic manufacturing). Table 1 shows this sort of effect at the global level (for 
an earlier period).  Total energy consumption in developed countries has risen 
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less than the GDP effect would have suggested (activity effect) due to a 
combination of structural effect (i.e. de-industrialisation and emergence of 
developing country manufacturing) and increased energy efficiency (intensity 
effect). However in developing countries and China there have been significant 
increases in energy consumption caused by the rise of their industry and some 
weakness in the energy efficiency of their industry. Table 1 cautions against 
taking a fall in energy demand in one country in isolation from what is happening 
elsewhere as a sign of progress worldwide. 
Table 1: Global drivers of energy consumption: Increase in energy consumption 1973-
1990 
million tonnes 
of oil 
equivalent 
(mtoe) 
Contribution by Total 
increase 
Activity 
effect 
Structural 
effect 
Intensity 
effect 
Developing 322.85 99.12 136.56 558.53 
     
China 178.65 243.90 -139.80 282.75 
     
Developed 1488.21 -204.35 -1069.16 214.70 
     
Eastern 
Europe, 
former USSR 
503.70 29.42 -210.53 322.59 
     
World 2493.41 168.09 -1282.93 1378.58 
 
Source: Sun (1998, p.98). 
2.2 Recent aggregate expenditure on energy services in the UK 
A basic conclusion of the observation of a stable long-run relationship between 
energy demand and price and income is that the share of income spent on energy 
services is roughly constant. High prices favour lower energy consumption as 
consumers experience ‘payment resistance’, while low prices incentivise 
increased consumption of energy services. This is illustrated in Figure 9. From 
1970 to 2008, the average share of total energy expenditure (including 
electricity, natural gas and liquid fuel) as a share of GDP was around 8%, even 
with the sharp rise in energy prices in the period to 1982, total energy 
expenditure only increased by 20%. Prices then fell back substantially as energy 
efficiency improvements continued to come through in the 1980s and 1990s. A 
EPRG No     1116                                                                                                               
12 
recent resurgence of prices since 2003 (substantially increasing energy prices) 
has only taken energy expenditure as a percentage of GDP back towards the 
average for the entire period. 
Figure 9:  UK energy expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics (GDP at Market Prices) and DUKES 2010 (Table 1.1.6). 
In 2009 total energy expenditure was £113 billion of which £17.5 billion was 
spent on natural gas, £31.1 billion on electricity and £61.2 billion on petroleum 
(of which £51.5 billion was road transport). Of the total expenditure, a significant 
share was taxation, with taxes on petroleum being £34.3 billion, with additional 
VAT being levied on domestic electricity and gas and a climate change levy being 
raised on industrial and commercial energy use, taking the total tax revenue to 
£37.3bn in 2009 (DUKES, 2010, Table 1.4). These numbers illustrate two 
important macroeconomic phenomena. First, that transport fuel is the most 
significant component of energy expenditure and hence driver of future energy 
demand (including for electricity). And second, that energy is an important 
source of government tax revenue, with 7% of total tax revenue coming from 
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taxation on the use of energy.6 This is in addition to taxation of the profits of 
energy companies and taxes on the production of oil and gas in the North Sea. 
Any migration of energy demand from heavily taxed liquid fuels to currently 
lightly taxed electricity will most likely require substantial tax rises on electricity 
to maintain the public finances. 
Newbery (2005) points out that energy is not efficiently taxed at the moment in 
the UK, as it does not follows rational approaches of public finance or a sensible 
carbon tax policy. Indeed, some types of fuels have very high taxes, whereas 
others are relatively lightly taxed. Thus liquid fuel for road transport has a high 
tax rate, whereas aviation fuel and gas for heating have very low tax rates. If 
taxes truly reflected environmental damage costs (of all types) and international 
security externalities, then taxes would be significantly increased on the less 
heavily taxed goods. Taxes should be used to give better price signals on the 
relative environmental damage of different fuels, to give incentives to reduce 
energy consumption and to raise tax revenue can be recycled to reduce the 
general level of taxation or to support public expenditure (including measures to 
help the fuel poor). 
Substantial components of overall energy expenditure arise from the industrial 
and commercial sectors of the economy. Indeed the relative aggregate figures are 
somewhat misleading as to the position for the household sector. The household 
sector spends almost twice as much on gas as on electricity (rather than the 
other way round for the whole economy) and about the same amount on liquid 
transport fuels as on electricity and gas. This indicates the relative importance of 
non-transport energy demand for households and the importance of heat 
demand relative to power demand. 
Energy services demand is not synonymous with demand for fuel and power. 
Energy services (e.g. lighting, heating and transport) are provided by a 
combination of capital equipment and energy. Expenditure on better household 
insulation or double glazing of windows is expenditure on energy services, 
because it has a similar ultimate effect to gas-fired central heating in raising the 
ambient household room temperature in the winter. A car and liquid fuel are 
                                                 
6 Total public sector receipts were £514bn in 2009-10 (Source: HM Treasury Public Finances 
Databank). 
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both required to provide transport services and expenditure on one can be 
substituted for the other at the margin by spending more on a more fuel efficient 
vehicle. A low energy light bulb or a more energy efficient domestic appliance 
will cost more money but use less electricity. 
Figure 10 looks at how large the expenditure on energy services is at the 
household level and its stability over time. From 1964 to 2008 we see that total 
consumer expenditure on the main categories of expenditure that are associated 
with energy services (as a percentage of GDP) fluctuated within fairly narrow 
bounds. We take energy services expenditure to be reflected in maintenance and 
repair of buildings and vehicles, capital expenditure on vehicles, fuels and other 
oils for vehicles and fuels (natural gas, heating oil and coal) and electricity. Not 
all expenditure on the maintenance and repair of buildings will be energy 
services related, but a substantial part will be related to the provision of thermal 
comfort and can also be substituted for energy expenditure in the future (e.g. 
solar panels as part of a new roof). The figure shows that substantial amount of 
expenditure on transport where expenditure on vehicles and on their repair 
exceeds expenditure on fuel. It also shows a gentle decline in the significance of 
household energy.  
For comparison Figure 10 shows expenditure on the various components of 
expenditure on communications services. This we take to be initially postal 
services (which have declined significantly) and latterly telecoms related. Here 
there is very little direct expenditure on equipment (as much of the equipment is 
supplied by service providers in return for the payment of usage charges). We 
return to communications services as a point of comparison with energy services 
later in this paper. 
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Figure 10: UK Energy and Communications services expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 
An examination of the macroeconomic context of energy demand suggests the 
size and significance of energy services expenditure. There is substantial scope 
for diverting the different shares of expenditure between power, heat and 
transport, and between equipment, maintenance and energy expenditures. While 
utility companies may be dominant in electricity and gas, major oil companies 
and major supermarkets are dominant in liquid fuels and a large number of 
different companies are present in the repair and maintenance of buildings and 
vehicles. The electrification of heating and transport and the reduction in the size 
of the markets of liquid fuels will be likely to attract the interest of current liquid 
fuel incumbents and will create new opportunities for substitution of equipment 
and repair and maintenance expenditures for expenditure on units of energy. 
The first report of the Committee on Climate Change (2008) in the UK illustrated 
the importance of electricity demand growth and the emergence of new 
technologies for reducing electricity consumption. In particular the Committee 
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suggested that without attempts to reduce emissions electricity demand might 
rise by 2.5% p.a. (CCC, 2008, p.55), partly as a result of climate change increasing 
the demand for air-conditioning. However with the application of new 
technologies such as LED lighting and efficient air conditioning, electricity 
demand could be 35% below its baseline figure by 2050 (CCC, 2008, p.55). 
However, some research on California  points to some ambiguous effects. Indeed, 
it has been shown that newer buildings (subject to stricter energy buildings 
standards) might enable higher temperature response7, as they are more likely 
to be equipped with air conditioners and are often larger, so that the cumulative 
effect on absolute electricity consumption is ambiguous, and the aggregate 
temperature response can be predicted to increase with new (and more energy 
efficient) construction (Chong, 2010). Even within industrial processes the 
Committee saw scope for the reduction of electricity demand (by 18% below 
baseline in 2050 – CCC, 2008, p.56). It is worth pointing out that these estimates 
are highly uncertain and that actual demand will significantly depend on outturn 
prices and incomes. 
3. The long-run microeconomic context of energy demand 
We now turn to how the demand for energy (and hence electricity) operates at 
the level of micro economics. It is worth beginning by discussing the relationship 
between the underlying physics of energy demand and the economics of energy 
consumption, and relating this back to individual behaviour and 
microeconomics.  
3.1 The physics of energy consumption and its relation to the 
economics of energy consumption 
MacKay (2008) discusses energy efficiency at the level of the device and the 
household. He points out that there is a big variation in existing energy 
efficiencies of transport and of heating and of household power devices. For each 
of these energy services, electric power is the most energy efficient. Thus for 
household heating a heat pump can convert one kWh of electricity into up to 
4KWh equivalent of heat. This implies that a gas-fired power station running at 
                                                 
7 Chong (2010) defines temperature response as the percentage increase (relative to usage on a 
65◦ F day) in electricity use due to a 1◦ F increase in temperature. Higher temperature response 
means more incremental electricity use. 
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53% electrical efficiency might be able to deliver electrical heat using half the gas 
of gas fired boiler with ‘90% efficiency’ (p.152-153). An electric car uses around 
15 kWh per 100 km, around 5 times less than the average fossil fuel car. This 
implies that even powered by the existing electricity system an electric car 
produces a quarter of the emissions per km of the average conventional vehicle 
(p.129-130). Electric household devices are notoriously inefficiently used. In the 
UK for instance, 8% of all electricity is used by devices on standby (DTI, 2006, 
p.43), and this could be reduced by a factor more than 10 for many devices. 
MacKay (p.157-158) gives the example of reducing his own household electricity 
consumption by 50% by reducing standby and installing energy efficient light-
bulbs. 
Allwood (2010) looks in more detail into the theoretical potential of energy 
efficiency by examining underlying material efficiency of production processes. 
He gives the example of the car where the energy required to power the car is a 
function of sum of the aerodynamic drag (of the car through the air), the 
mechanical drag (of the wheels on the road) and the inertia (which must be 
overcome to get it moving). He suggests how the force required to move the car 
at a constant speed can be reduced substantially. This can be done by getting the 
mass of the car down (by 75%), reducing the friction coefficient (by 93%), 
reducing the drag coefficient (by 75%) and shortening the frontal area of the car 
(by 25%). He calculates that the energy required can thus be reduced by 91%. 
This sort of calculation indicates the scale of the efficiency improvements that 
are theoretically possible in providing the same level of energy service. These 
fundamental redesigns of the way energy services are provided substantially 
exceed the efficiency improvements that are possible in industry from simply 
producing existing energy intensive goods more efficiently. Examination of the 
energy efficiency savings in the production of steel, cement, plastic, paper and 
aluminium shows that use of best practice technology and recycling only reduces 
energy consumption by less than 50% in most scenarios. 
The conclusion we can draw from the above is that large physical potential 
savings in energy use are possible (often involving increases in the scope of use 
of electricity). However the economics of such savings do not currently stack up. 
For instance, heat pumps are very expensive and involve very high capital costs, 
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relative to existing gas-fired boilers. They also involve significant running costs, 
and many would currently be more expensive to run than a gas boiler.8 There is 
also the issue of whether the quality of the service provided is comparable. Heat 
pumps are more intrusive and can take up more space in a household room. 
Electric vehicles have limited mileage ranges and slower refueling times. A car 
which weighs 75% less, is less wide and has very low drag (sitting the passenger 
lower down) will not necessarily be considered as safe, comfortable or stylish as 
existing vehicles.  
Indeed it is clear from history that there is always a wide-range of observed 
efficiencies in the economy, with the average efficiency of the provision of an 
energy service being significantly less than the efficiency of the most efficient. 
Current new fossil fuel cars and gas boilers are 50-100% more efficient than that 
of the average fleet. Indeed as we saw in Figure 7 technologies tend to persist 
long after the appearance of apparently superior and more efficient ones (which 
will indeed eventually become dominant) have appeared. This is partly because 
initially new technologies are relatively expensive (even for new installations) 
and partly because of lock-in to existing technologies whereby individuals and 
companies continue to use existing technologies because they have already 
invested in them and incurred their up-front capital costs or are uncertain over 
future energy savings (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993). Thus the average life of 
energy service equipment, as well as its cost becomes an important determinant 
of how the average efficiency relates to the highest available efficiency.  
3.2 The apparent non-rationality of individual energy 
consumption 
Another important consideration in economics is apparently non-rational 
behaviour. The idea that energy efficiency measures which reduce cost will 
necessarily be implemented is based on neo-classical consumer theory, which 
says that more is always preferred to less and that individual economic decision 
makers will always take actions which are in their economic interests. There are 
                                                 
8 If the average price of 20000 KWh of gas is 2.61p/kWh and the marginal price of electricity is 
9.62p/kWh (a typical tariff on 17th September 2010). A heat pump would need to have a 
coefficient of performance of greater than 3.31 to reduce running costs below that of 90% 
efficient gas boiler. 
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a number of important challenges to this, only some of which are genuinely 
about irrationality. 
First, even neo-classical theory suggests the paramount importance of 
considerations of who benefits as distinct from who bears the cost of an action. 
Thus apparently non-rational behaviour may simply reflect the fact that it is not 
the same individual (or group of individuals) who benefits from switching off the 
light-bulb or installing energy saving equipment as the individuals who have to 
incur the inconvenience (however minor) of taking energy saving actions. In the 
commercial sector and in the rented sector this is often exemplified by the 
tenant-landlord split whereby it is the landlord who has to decide on and 
organise investment in energy saving equipment, but it is the tenant who 
benefits through lower bills (as discussed in Grubb and Wilde, 2008). Within the 
household there may be competing incentives and perceptions – one of our 
colleagues was told to remove his energy saving bulbs by his wife who did not 
like the quality of the light produced by them! 
Second, the well-known marginal cost of abatement curve (e.g. Committee on 
Climate Change, 2008, p.226) suggests that there are large unexploited energy 
efficiency savings in the commercial and household sectors. However this only 
values the benefit of the action against its capital cost, not against the time and 
inconvenience costs which would be incurred to deliver what are often 
individually small savings which require significant up-front investments of 
individual or organisational time. Thus even for a commercial business, 
prioritising energy cost savings may come at the expense of sales enhancing 
strategies which could have been worked on by the same individuals. Some 
energy savings may even come at the direct expense of sales, e.g. if keeping shop 
doors closed (to reducing heating bills) or not visiting clients in person (to 
reduce transport costs) actually results in less business.  
Third, behavioural economics, which looks at how individuals actually behave 
when making economic decisions, has suggested a number of phenomena which 
may be increasingly important to take account of in considering the future of 
energy demand. These include: liquidity constraints, expectations, loss aversion, 
commitment devices and perceptions. Brutscher (2010) investigates these in the 
context of explaining top-up behaviour by electricity customers using pre-
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payment meters in Northern Ireland. He starts by observing that individuals top-
up by significantly less than is rational given interest rates and the costs of 
topping up (using a Baumol-Tobin Model). He finds that given fixed costs of 
topping up (the opportunity cost of time taken to go on-line, telephone or buy 
credit in-store) versus the lost interest on credit balance, individuals should top 
up 2.3 times a year at £230 per time. What actually happens is that individuals 
top-up around 50 times a year, by £13 per time. Liquidity constraints would 
suggest that the reason why people might do this is because they do not ever 
have £230. Expectations theory might suggest individuals worry about future 
changes in prices in ways that might reduce the optimality of their top-ups. Loss 
aversion might suggest that people worry about the potential for loosing larger 
credit balances (should the meter malfunction or they have to move house). 
Commitment device theory might suggest that individuals use low top amounts 
in order to force themselves to be more conscious of energy use, because they 
are forced to check their meter more regularly. Perceptions may matter because 
intuitively people may prefer spending a series of small amounts of expenditures 
than a one-off expenditure of the equivalent amount. Therefore we might prefer 
pay-as-you-go expenditures over lump sum contracts, even if the lump sum 
contract is cheaper (Finkelstein, 2009). Brutscher (2010) finds evidence for 
perceptions theory as an explanation of actual top-up behaviour in Northern 
Ireland. One implication of this is that smart meters which facilitate small top-
ups may make many consumers less concerned about their energy consumption 
by making them think they are spending less on energy than they actually are. 
Behavioural economics may prove to be very significant in both explaining 
observed energy behaviour (with and without smart meters) and in 
understanding how best to encourage individuals to make more rational energy 
decisions. This relates to Thaler and Sunstein’s idea of nudge theory (2009), 
where the way information is presented (rather than the underlying financial 
characteristics) may be very important for the final aggregate outcome and that 
small changes in the way information is presented might have very large impacts 
on behaviour. 
Fourth, there are serious issues of poverty and vulnerability in the provision of 
energy services. An estimated 4.9 million households in the UK are currently in 
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fuel poverty (i.e. spending 10% or more their income on household energy) (see 
Waddams, 2011). This is around 20% of all households; in some regions the 
figure is more than 40%. Of those households perhaps half are vulnerable 
households, i.e. households with sick, disabled, children or elderly people who 
are more vulnerable to cold-related illness (Bolton, 2010) and hence, for whom 
adequate provision of energy might have serious impacts on health and for 
whom rational decisions about energy consumption may not be possible. Fuel 
poverty may merely be a component of poverty, but it clearly has implications 
for the future of energy demand. The fuel poor may be exempted from general 
pressures to raise energy prices to bring about the long-run transition required 
by decarbonisation targets, or they may be targeted for capital expenditure 
interventions which reduce their regular expenditure. The poor may exhibit very 
different income and price elasticities from the national average. Concerns about 
the nature of the social contract with the poor in transition and developing 
countries explain large subsidies to reduce energy prices (which are often very 
poorly targeted). Climate change policy may increasingly come up against such 
pressures to subsidise final prices for large numbers of customers (and hence 
raising the cost for others). 
Finally, it is worth saying that inefficiency and variability in decision making are 
a general characteristic of energy markets (and indeed all markets). Wilson and 
Waddams (2010) analysed the behaviour of household consumers in choosing 
electricity and gas supplier. They found that a significant number of consumers 
switched to a higher tariff when they intended to switch to a cheaper one, 
whereas less than half of those switching to get the cheapest price chose the 
cheapest tariff available at the time of switching. They concluded that this 
demonstrated a combination of computational mistakes (the ‘bounded 
rationality’ of consumers, following Simon, 1947), the fact that factors other 
price alone (such as the quality of service) were also important and that 
companies might make it difficult for consumers to calculate exactly how much 
they were going to pay under any tariff using so-called “foggy tactics” (Miravete, 
2007), hidden clauses, tiny fonts (thereby being an example of a ‘confusopoly’9). 
This was in addition to the fact that 50% of customers had never switched 
                                                 
9 This term was introduced by Scott Adams in The Dilbert Future (1997). 
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supplier, even though they could have saved money by moving away from the 
incumbent. It is simply a fact that customers of any given product exhibit high 
degrees of inertia, value quality of service, are prone to miscalculations or are 
faced with confusing (and sometimes misleading) information from service 
providers. Thus apparently optimal solutions only spread slowly through the 
economy. 
One of the ways in which individual energy users might become better informed 
is via social networks. This could happen for householders through being in 
touch with other better informed individuals (e.g. friends, family, neighbours, 
members of social network groups).  Or it could happen for companies through 
interactions with motivated outside stakeholders (such as green NGOs). Zhang 
and Nuttall (2008) uses agent based modelling to show how a supplier-led smart 
meter role out might develop as a result of social and economic influences on 
individual households. Brophy Haney et al. (2009) show how high street retail 
companies are more likely to have adopted tougher energy and climate 
objectives, if they have connections with more outside stakeholders of a 
particular type (most notably academic institutions). Participation in energy 
saving clubs can be associated with substantially enhanced demand reduction as 
participants share ideas (though the likelihood of voluntary participation might 
be low).10 Social capital and its relation to the encouragement of energy 
efficiency (and more efficient consumption in general)11 would seem to be an 
important idea reflected in these results. 
3.3 How to encourage energy efficiency 
Now we turn to the underlying micro-economics of energy services to discuss 
how easy it is likely to be to encourage the uptake of energy efficient products. 
Energy services are goods which are quantity, place, time and quality specific. 
They are a derived, or intermediate, demand, in that the final price of the good 
which requires energy to be used is what consumers in general perceive, rather 
than just the price of the energy. As the energy cost is less than 100% of the cost 
                                                 
10 See Ofgem (2010, p.9) for some evidence from the UK. 
11 See Pepper et al. (2009) who discusses the link between green consumption and sustainable 
consumption in general. Pollitt (2010) argues for the importance of a more holistic engagement 
with individuals’ religious beliefs in eliciting behavioural change related to the achievement of 
climate change policy targets. 
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of the service this dilutes the impact of changes in energy prices on the final price 
to which customers respond. This is further complicated in that, although the 
marginal cost of consuming the product may be substantially made up of the 
energy cost, individuals may only consider the average total cost (possibly due to 
pre-commitment to use the product once purchased and also due to bounded 
rationality). 
3.3.1 Raising prices  
Table 2 shows a rough calculation for the costs of energy part of certain energy 
services in relation to the total cost of the service. It is immediately why low-
energy light-bulbs are high up the list of products that individuals are willing to 
buy in order to save energy. Even for a low energy light bulb costing £1, 94% of 
the lifetime cost is the electricity consumed. Having an energy efficient gas boiler 
should be high up the list of actions to take if a £1000 up-front cost is not a 
problem. Cold storage services provided by fridges are roughly one third energy 
costs. However for a computer or a mobile phone the energy cost is a small 
fraction of the total annual cost. 
Table 2: Lifetime costs of certain energy related services 
Capital Cost £ Lifetime energy cost £ Total cost Energy cost %
Lightbulb 100W 0.35 18.98 19.33 98.2%
Lightbulb low energy 100W 1 15.53 16.53 94.0%
Gas Boiler 1000 7629.05 8629.05 88.4%
TV 700 540.01 1240.01 43.5%
Fridge 300 159.56 459.56 34.7%
Car (annual) 2500 3500.00 28.6%
Computer 1000 48.84 1048.84 4.7%
Mobile phone (annual) 360 1.42 361.42 0.4%  
Key assumptions: Electricity 13p/kWh; gas 3.5p/kWh; 5% discount rate 
Table 2 suggests that doubling the price of electricity or of natural gas is likely to 
have a significant impact on the uptake of low energy light bulbs or energy 
efficient boilers and energy use per unit of lighting service or heating comfort. 
However it is likely to have a negligible impact on incentivising the purchase of 
energy efficient mobile phones. For these energy related services agreed energy 
efficiency standards might be very important in encouraging the manufacture 
and sale of more energy efficient devices. Table 2 has a further implication: as 
energy efficiency improves it is likely to get harder to influence energy demand 
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via price effects. This is because the share of energy in the cost of the service is 
likely to drop over time (unless the price rises to compensate) thus reducing the 
incentive to achieve further efficiencies. Income elasticities for certain energy 
related services will be very important drivers of energy demand. Income 
elasticity for additional fridges (at households which already have one) is likely 
to be low, however only around 1/3 of UK households currently have 
dishwashers, while demand for personal electronic equipment is likely to be 
highly income elastic. Interestingly it is also the case that energy consumption is 
rising fastest for the categories of energy service where the share of energy in 
total costs is lowest, such as personal electronic devices (see Figure 11). Power 
for personal electronic devices (including computing) has increased from 19% of 
total domestic electricity consumption in 1990 to 32% in 2009, by contrast 
lighting demand has fallen from 24% to 19% over the same period. 
Figure 11:  Shares of different devices in household electricity demand in the UK, 1970-
2009 
 
Source: DECC (2010b). 
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3.3.2 Electrification of personal transport 
New sources of electricity demand may emerge which substantially change the 
total demand for electricity and the way electricity is consumed by the 
household. The Tesla Roadster12 stores 53 kWh of electricity and has maximum 
power rating of 185 KW (Mackay, 2008, p.129). Typical daily household demand 
is about 10 kWh with a maximum power of 10 KW. An electric car has a typical 
charge and discharge efficiency of 85% of the electrical energy used to charge 
the car. The impact of charging an electric car at home would be to substantially 
shift electricity demand towards the residential sector and to increase aggregate 
electricity demand. It would also increase the maximum power drawn by the 
household, though this would substantially depend on the rate of charge 
required (53kWh could be delivered overnight in 7 hours at 8.91 KW power). 
Given the average household consumption at the evening peak in winter is only 1 
KW13, a substantial penetration of electric vehicles charging at home would be a 
substantial system load. It would also imply substantial infrastructure 
investments and have significant implications for the grid. 
However electric vehicles offer other possibilities. They offer substantial battery 
storage capacity to the electricity grid, both when stationary at home and when 
at work. They may thus be very useful in providing short term back-up at system 
demand peaks or for dumping electricity to the batteries when supply is at a 
peak (due to the running of large quantities of intermittent renewables). This 
sort of linkup between intermittent wind generation and electric vehicle demand 
is being trialled on the Danish island of Bornholm.14 Electric vehicles also offer 
the ability to shift the location of consumption around the grid, with cars 
charging at work and discharging at home or vice versa. Indeed it would possible 
that commercial loads could be supported by discharging vehicles during the day 
time and then return home to charge up at night. 
                                                 
12 The Tesla Roadster is an electric sport car prototype manufactured by Tesla Motors 
(http://www.teslamotors.com/). 
13 This is based on there being around 25 million homes in the UK and peak household demand of 
around 25,000 MW (as discussed below). 
14 See www.edison-net.dk. 
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3.3.3 The size of the elasticities 
The evidence on elasticity of demand with respect to price and income is large, 
but difficult to interpret (see Steinbuks, this volume). There is also a substantial 
difference between the short run and long run responses to a price or income 
change. Espey and Espey (2004) looked at a number of studies of household 
electricity demand and found that the median short run price elasticity for 
electricity was -0.28 rising to -0.81 in the long-run. They found the median short 
run income elasticity was 0.15 rising to 0.92 in the long-run. This highlights the 
importance of raising real prices as incomes rise if demand is not to increase 
over time. For transport Espey (1998) looked at a larger number of studies and 
found lower median elasticities in the long run. The median short run price 
elasticity of demand was -0.23 rising to -0.43 in the long run. Espey also found 
the median short run income elasticity of demand was 0.39 rising to 0.81 in the 
long run. Given that energy costs are currently a relatively small part of the 
running costs of a petrol-powered car (see Table 2) and would decline 
substantially for electric vehicles, electricity demand for transport would not be 
particularly sensitive to its own price. Indeed over time we would already be 
expecting to see price elasticities of demand for energy declining as energy 
became less significant as a share of the total cost of energy related service. 
3.3.4 Shifting electricity consumption across time and place 
Electricity consumed at different times of the day and time of the year has 
different underlying resource costs. Figure 12 charts the daily variation in prices 
for three days in 2009 on the UK power system. Prices vary considerably. On an 
off-peak day the price per MWh in the power market does not rise above £50 per 
MWh or 5p/kWh, significantly less than the price paid by residential consumers 
for each additional unit of power. However on a median day the price varies 
between £30 per MWh and £100 per MWh for half hour periods across a 24 hour 
period. On the peak day on the system prices reached £800 per MWh or 80p / 
kWh. For median days there is a strong incentive for large energy intensive users 
to use electricity at night rather than during the day. Smart demand response 
from commercial and residential users could exploit this underlying price 
differential, either by reducing consumption or by shifting it to a cheaper time. 
Residential consumers could therefore reduce marginal generation costs.  
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Figure 12: Demand shifting is potentially important 
 
Source: APX (2010). 
The potential for demand shifting, even by a couple of hours, could be 
substantial. At the system peak time a disproportionate part of the load is made 
up residential demand (45%, against an average of 36% final energy 
consumption15). Figure 13 shows the components of household demand at the 
typical daily winter peak (of 52016 GW in this case).  5% of total domestic 
demand is simply devices on stand-by, while another 6% is wet appliances such 
as dishwashers and washing machines many of which could be run later at night. 
Another 9% is represented by cold appliances which could be pre-cooled before 
the system peak to maintain their target temperature over the peak period 
before switching back on. Next the 16.5% of demand due to water heaters could 
also be turned on earlier to have hot water available ahead of the system peak. 
Pre-loading of devices with energy does imply added energy cost due to energy 
losses, but with better thermal insulation this cost could be kept low. 
                                                 
15 36% is calculated as the domestic share of final electricity consumption in 2007, reported in 
DUKES (2010, Table 5.1, p.132). 
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Figure 13: The components of household energy demand at system peak 
 
Source: Lampaditou and Leach (2005). 
Residential consumers could also respond to local voltage or national frequency 
changes (i.e. providing backup demand response equivalent to backup 
generation response). The National Grid spends several hundred million pounds 
per year on spinning reserve16 to maintain frequency in the national 
transmission system. In theory households could provide a form of virtual 
spinning reserve. This is possible if fridges, freezers, washing machines and 
dishwashers could be interrupted for short periods a small number of times per 
year in return for a payment related to the current payment for spinning 
reserve.17 
                                                 
16 Spinning reserves refer to generators that can instantaneously increase the power they 
generate, in case of a decrease in frequency, i.e. when load is greater than generation.  Electricity 
system operators are required to maintain a certain amount of spinning reserves in the case of 
sudden surges in power demand. 
17 See Samarakoon, K., Ekanayake, J.,  Jenkins, N. (2010), A Demonstration of a Load Control 
Scheme to Provide Primary Frequency Response through Smart Meters, Poster Presented at Flexnet 
Annual Assembly May 2010. 
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A number of economic issues arise with this exploiting this potential for demand 
response. These include the size of the likely benefit relative to the costs. Time of 
use pricing is relatively straightforward to implement and already exists for a 
significant number of customers (on Economy 7 tariffs, or the PowerShift tariff in 
Northern Ireland). This sort of tariff does not require two way communications 
with the meter; it only requires a clock in the meter so that charging occurs in 
line with the charge periods. Real time pricing, where prices change according to 
spot prices in the market requires two-way communication with the household 
meter. This implies additional telecoms costs as well as creating uncertainty 
about the actual price that the consumer will face. Assuming demand response 
arising from real time pricing is to be largely automated via sequential switching 
off particular appliances, this requires additional communications infrastructure 
within the home, and possibly smart controls on the appliances connected to the 
meter. Contracts could specify the nature of the demand response to real time 
prices (e.g. pay a fixed price and get a reduction for limiting consumption to a 
specified maximum level when the price rises above a certain level on the spot 
market). Indeed critical peak pricing is a limited form of real time pricing 
whereby strong incentives to reduce consumption are given at certain times of 
the year. Thus usually involves a known price paid for a measured response at 
the critical peak. This requires a two-way communication system, but can be 
quite basic (e.g. a red light on the meter), aimed at soliciting a manual response 
by the householder to the signal received. 
Brophy Haney et al. (this volume) discuss the evidence from trials on the size of 
the effect from time of use, real time and critical peak pricing. They conclude that 
peak savings of up to 15% are possible, with demand reductions of up to 10%, 
though it is not entirely clear how much of the savings are due to improved 
information on energy use alone. For the UK, the evidence from Northern Ireland 
is that the introduction of better prepayment meters (which gave clearer 
information on energy use) reduced demand by up to 5% (Boyd, 2008). 
A further overall consideration is the fact that if there is significant 
responsiveness of demand, this begins to significantly reduce the marginal 
benefit of further response, flattening the price curve and reducing the cost of 
spinning reserve. This reduces the value of additional responsiveness and the 
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incentives to respond if responsive demand only receives its marginal value to 
the system. In short responders create positive externalities for other users 
which would somehow need to be recycled back to the responders. There may 
also be issues to do with the fact that rich consumers might have more 
opportunities to benefit from offering demand response (e.g. because they could 
afford the state of the art household appliances capable of responding and 
because they use more non-essential appliances) and hence this would further 
exacerbate fuel poverty concerns. 
Lampaditou and Leach (2005) conduct a simulation, in line with Figure 13 above. 
They suggest that time of use pricing with water/wet appliances might lead to a 
47% decrease in the household morning peak (due to a shift of water heating) 
and a 6% decrease in the household evening peak (due to a shift of wet 
appliances). They calculate that this could generate consumer benefits of up to 
£52 per year per consumer (using average spot prices of random winter day 
from UK APX 2005). However if there was direct load control (by the grid) of 
major appliances at 5-6 pm (due to shifting use and better cycling) there could 
be much greater responsiveness in the evening peak. They suggest that switching 
off washing machines, tumble driers, dish washers & cold appliances would 
cause a 15% of household peak reduction (or 3500 MW), rising to a 23% 
reduction if there was better cycling of water heaters (5500 MW).  Clearly these 
figures represent the upper end of what is technically possible, rather than 
reasonable estimates of the likely uptake of contracts for such response. Silva et 
al. (this volume) present more recent simulations of the benefits of 
responsiveness from domestic appliances. 
Actual household demand responsiveness will be driven by consumer 
willingness to participate in the contracts that might be offered by suppliers for 
demand response. A large percentage of consumers are likely to show no 
response (in line with more than 50% of consumers who have not switched 
electricity supplier).18 Other consumers will respond depending on the size of 
the benefits available to them (their ability to respond) and on their view of the 
level of control they would like exercised by external parties. Remote control of 
appliances will raise issues of data security, confidence in the technology and the 
                                                 
18 See Ipsos Mori (2010). 
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availability of easy overrides. Uptake will also be likely to be a function of the 
extent to which consumers can understand the contracts being offered. It seems 
likely that simple contracts will be favoured and that widespread use of real time 
pricing is unlikely in the current environment. It is also the case that people 
prefer the insurance that fixed tariffs offer (most consumers currently pay a 
fixed amount monthly)19 and hence may well be prepared to pay a premium to 
avoid exposure to variable tariffs. 
A major discussion which has gone on at the transmission level, and to some 
extent at the distribution level, of electricity networks is the role of nodal prices 
(location varying) prices (see Pollitt and Bialek, 2008). These prices allow the 
reflection of marginal congestion costs around the electricity system. Additional 
demands located at congested nodes impose both short run energy losses and 
long run expansion costs on the network as a whole. While additional generation 
at these loads reduces short run losses and longer run expansion costs. Of course 
it is already possible to differentiate prices by location alone. However truly 
efficient nodal prices vary by time of day, and hence nodes heavily congested at 
the national system peak are not likely to be congested off-peak. At the moment 
most loads and all households pay the same for electricity from a given supplier 
within the same distribution network area. Thus it would be possible that there 
is some quantifiable benefit from varying retail prices more by location than they 
do currently.  Estimates from Heng (2010) suggest that locational import and 
export energy prices might vary significantly within the same distribution 
network. Location varying charges within distribution networks may be 
particularly useful in avoiding the need for local network upgrades. All the same 
issues arise with location varying charging as with time related charging, except 
that the idea that individuals living physically very close to one another might 
pay different prices according to the condition of the electricity distribution 
network may raise fairness issues which may be difficult to explain. 
Locational, as well as, time varying prices are particularly relevant to transport 
demand for electricity. We already have place varying prices for liquid fuel (i.e. 
every petrol station can set its price independently). It may be very useful to 
have locational varying prices reflecting the efficient cost of supplying electricity 
                                                 
19 See Ipsos Mori (2010). 
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to particular parts of the network. Indeed it is possible that transport demand at 
high levels of penetration could significantly improve the efficiency of 
operational and capital expenditure on the distribution networks.  
4. Conclusions on the economics of electricity demand 
There is much that we can imagine about the potential future of energy demand 
and its degree of responsiveness. However there are things that we know we 
don’t know about the energy future. 
First, the scale of the IT challenge is unclear until we know what we would like 
the power system to do and the degree of public acceptability for the massive 
amounts of data transfer that could be involved.  
Second, we don’t know what outturn response elasticities could be. The previous 
estimates vary widely. The London Congestion Charge for vehicles actually 
revealed an elasticity of demand with respect to price of -0.42 against a value -
0.15 predicted (Evans, 2008), leading to significantly more price response and 
significantly lower charge revenue than predicted.  
Third, we don’t know what innovations might come along in heat and in 
transport which impact back on electricity demand. The recent revolution in 
telecoms suggests expect the unexpected (e.g. growth of SMS messaging).  
Fourth, we don’t know which diversifying entrants will enter (e.g. device 
retailers, supermarkets, oil and gas majors). Evidence suggests that it is likely 
that well positioned incumbents in related sectors will enter if profitable entry 
opportunities present themselves (see Klepper and Simons, 2000).  
Fifth, we don’t know how consumers will react to the new technological and 
contractual opportunities. Official trials of smart meters appear to have been 
disappointing in the UK (see Ofgem, 2010), but this may be because of the way 
the trials have been set up. It may be the case that actually or apparently non-
rational behaviour is likely.  
Sixth, we are likely to see the exhaustion of the benefit of new demand 
technologies at relatively low levels of penetration. It may not be worth signing 
more people up to a new tariff or equipping them with new technology given the 
increasing marginal cost of persuading additional householders to participate 
and the declining marginal benefits of them doing so. 
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In closing, there would seem to be four important messages from our discussion 
in sections 2 and 3.  
First, higher prices are key to demand moderation. Prices must rise 
(nationally and globally) as technology improves to avoid a significant rebound 
in demand arising from more efficient appliances and higher income.  The good 
news is economies can and do adjust to high energy prices and consumers may 
not notice the difference in the long-run. 
Second, price signals should be helped by standards. As income rises and 
energy service equipment becomes more energy efficient, then prices will 
become a weaker signal, especially for new sources of demand. Energy efficiency 
standards will remain important policies driving long-run demand. 
Third, shifting electricity demand is worthwhile and may be easier and more 
valuable than actual reduction. This is especially true if there is a rise in electric 
vehicles and in renewable penetration, which will make the exact time and place 
of consumption important as well as the quantity of consumption. This is an area 
where new business models are required - and already emerging - to fully exploit 
the potential benefits by inducing behavioural change. 
Finally, the full potential for demand reduction and response is unlikely to be 
fully realised. The demand side of electricity consumption is decided by the 
interaction of millions of decisions made by human beings with bounded 
rationality and mixed incentives. Some of the aspects of such diversity of 
patterns of consumption have beneficial impacts – such as through load 
flattening for instance. However, it always has been and always will be the case 
that we will look at the current pattern of consumption and be able to identify 
significant theoretical scope for savings. The hope is that we can achieve as much 
demand reduction and response as is possible within the constraints, some of 
which it may be possible to reduce. 
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